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ABSTRACT
Th e development of sub-regional communities in Africa is not a new phenomenon, but 
the incorporation of human rights into their agenda is relatively new. In eff ect, REC courts 
have introduced a new layer of supra national protection of human rights in Africa. Th e 
development is welcomed because it is likely to advance the cause for the promotion and 
protection of human rights. However, considering that the primary focus of the RECs 
is economic development, their ability to eff ectively embrace the role of human rights 
protection is questionable. Th e development of this mandate for the sub-regional courts is 
necessitated by the emerging prominence of human rights in the business of RECs. But, 
its interpretation and implementation has extensive ramifi cations for the advancement of 
human rights in Africa; the harmonisation of human rights standard in the region and for 
the unity and eff ectiveness of the African human rights system. 
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1 Introduction
Regional integration in post-colonial Africa began in 1963, with the adoption of 
the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). This regional initiative 
was followed by the formation of sub-regional economic communities, commonly 
referred to as Regional Economic Communities (RECs) such as the East Africa 
Community (1967), the Economic Community of West African States (1975) 
and the Southern Africa Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC, 
1980). In general, the main objective of the co-operation was the pursuit of 
economic development of member states.1 Save for a remote reference to the 
United Nations Declaration of Human Rights the purposes of the OAU did not 
include the promotion or protection of human rights. In addition, though the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter) was adopted 
in 1981, promotion and protection of human rights only became an objective of 
the African Union (AU) in the year 2000 upon the adoption of the Constitutive 
Act of the African Union.2 
Similarly, the founding documents of most RECs adopted before the African 
Charter, did not provide for protection or promotion of human rights whether 
as a goal or principle thereof. Currently however, promotion and protection of 
human rights and democracy is part of the fundamental principles or goals of 
most RECs. In effect, the RECs have introduced a new layer of supranational 
protection and promotion of human rights in Africa. Their courts now play an 
important role in the protection of human rights through the determination of 
human rights cases. 
Whereas the entry of RECs as an avenue for protection of rights is generally 
favourably hailed (VILJOEN, 2007, p. 503), its novelty demands a consideration as 
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to their appropriateness as fora for the protection of human rights. Particularly, 
there is need to establish the place of REC courts within the African human rights 
system (AHRS) and their relationship with the regional human rights institutions. 
There is also concern over their capacity to effectively exercise the new competence 
in light of the economic focus of their founding treaties. The potential impact of 
the proliferation of human rights courts on the unity of international human rights 
law in Africa and how best to deal with this reality is another outstanding issue 
for advocates for human rights in the region. 
This article examines the significance of the role of the REC courts in the 
protection of human rights in Africa. In doing so some of the challenges facing 
their place in the African human rights system will be interrogated such as their 
suitability as fora to resolve human rights disputes and the implications of their 
integration into the larger regional framework. 
2 Regional integration in Africa - historical background 
 to the inclusion of a general human rights agenda
After the demise of colonial rule in Africa, mainly in the 1960s, the reality 
of the political and economic fragility of post-colonial African states became 
apparent. In response to this reality, African states were called upon to 
integrate politically and economically in order to achieve development and to 
undo the balkanization of Africa brought by colonialism (LOLETTE, 2005). 
This was to be done through the creation of larger markets and consolidation 
of the resources and potential of the poor economies (THOKO, 2004, p. 1). 
Though this agenda was not immediately achieved at the regional level, states 
began to come together in their respective sub-regions following a pattern of 
geographical proximity (ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA, 2006). Hence, 
most RECs are centred on geographical sub-regions (VILJOEN, 2007, p. 488). 
The 1996 OAU decision to divide Africa into 5 sub-regions along geographical 
lines seems to have endorsed this approach (AJULU, 2005, p. 19). In 1980 the 
OAU adopted the Lagos Plan of Action triggering a process that culminated 
in the adoption of the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community, 
commonly referred as the Abuja Treaty (KOUASSI, 2007; RUPPEL, 2009). While 
the Abuja process postdates the formation of some of the RECs, its inf luence 
on the place of human rights in their operations is evident from the framing 
of their documents which in some cases almost replicate its provisions (EAST 
AFRICAN COMMUNITY, 2007, art. 3(g), art. 6 (d)). 
Pursuit of African economic integration through the African Economic 
Community (AEC) is a core project of the OAU/AU. Arguments that economic 
integration did not take centre stage in the transformation of the OAU into the AU 
(VILJOEN, 2007, p. 480) notwithstanding, the Constitutive Act of the AU recognises 
the need to coordinate and harmonize policies between the existing and future RECs 
for gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union (AFRICAN UNION, 2000, art. 3 
(c, l)). This reaffirms the centrality of RECs to AU agenda and their role as economic 
building blocks within the AU. Alongside other factors (RUPPEL, 2009, p. 275),3 the 
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Abuja process can be regarded as the key driver behind both the formation of RECs 
across the continent,4 and the inclusion of human rights in the agenda of the RECs.
There are other reasons for the integration of human rights into the mandate 
of RECs. First, the adoption of the African Charter has made human rights a 
common feature in interstate relations on the continent (EBOBRAH, 2009a, p. 80). 
The obligations of states emanating from the Charter and other human rights 
treaties to which African states are party, oblige them to reflect human rights 
protection in subsequent commitments such as those arising from REC treaties 
(THOKO, 2004, p. 112).5 Second, human rights coupled with good governance 
create an appropriate investment climate that is critical to furthering economic 
development (RUPPEL, 2009, p. 279). The adoption of strong human rights values 
and institutions creates confidence for investors and trading partners and ensures 
effective participation of individuals.
Finally, 
international human rights law emphasises the importance of human rights obligations in 
all areas of governance and development and requires governments and economic policy 
forums [such as RECs] to take into account human rights principles while formulating 
national, regional and international economic agendas.
(OLOKA-ONYANGO; UDAGAMA, 1999, para. 47). 
3 Evolution of human rights into the mandate of REC courts6
It is evident that in the recent past human rights have become a fundamental 
component of the task of RECs in Africa. This development can be regarded as 
a response to the regional agenda as set out in the African Charter and the Abuja 
Treaty. The mandate of REC courts has also now been extended to cover human 
rights. However, the approaches adopted by RECs in this regard are dissimilar and 
uncoordinated. Hence concerns persist as to their suitability as forums for promotion 
and protection of human rights, the delimitation of such role so as to remain 
legitimate yet sufficiently utilitarian within the existing frameworks of RECs, and 
the implications of these new actors on the human rights discourse in the continent.
RECs tend to have an institutional structure that includes a court which is 
the judicial or principal legal organ of the community to deal with controversies 
relating to the interpretation or application of the REC’s law (RUPPEL, 2009, p. 
282). As the organs vested with such responsibility, they have, as a result of the 
incorporation of human rights into the agenda of RECs, been required to adjudicate 
over cases, to interpret provisions of their treaties or to advise their principals on 
questions with implications for human rights. The treaties of most RECs have 
therefore gradually moved towards according REC courts competence to hear 
human rights cases (EBOBRAH, 2009a, p. 80).
The evolution of protection of human rights as an agenda of RECs and as part 
of the jurisdiction of their courts is unique to each one of them, and the approaches 
adopted in this regard are also different. Thus to trace these developments, it is 
necessary to look at some of these RECs and their courts in turn.
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3.1 Economic Community of the West African States, (ECOWAS)
ECOWAS is a fifteen member group of West African states formed in 1975 to promote 
economic integration of member states.7 This scope of co-operation expanded in 
tandem with the need to respond to issues in the member states which also created 
an entry point for human rights into the agenda of ECOWAS (EBOBRAH, 2008, p. 7). 
Its founding Treaty did not contain any references to human rights (EBOBRAH, 2008, 
p. 9). Gradually however, protocols adopted under the Treaty incorporated different 
rights in their scope, culminating in the 1991 ECOWAS Declaration of Political 
Principles which expressed, amongst others, a determination by member states to 
respect fundamental human rights as embodied in the African Charter.8 In 1993 the 
Treaty of ECOWAS was amended to recognise promotion and protection of human 
and peoples’ rights in accordance with the African Charter as a fundamental principle 
of ECOWAS.9 The move towards rights consciousness was therefore a combination 
of necessity and changing international dynamics (NWOGU, 2007, p. 349). 
The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice (ECOWAS Court) is the judicial 
arm (ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES, 1993, art. 6 (1)(e)) and 
the principal legal organ (ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES, 
1991b) of ECOWAS. The Protocol to operationalize the ECOWAS Court was adopted 
in 1991 and amended in 2005 and 2006 respectively10 to give the ECOWAS Court 
competence to determine cases of violation of human rights occurring in any of the 
member states (EBOBRAH, 2009a, p. 86). The ECOWAS Court has since admitted and 
determined several cases on human rights11 and is the only of the courts highlighted 
in this article that has an express mandate over questions of human rights.
3.2 The Southern Africa Development Community, (SADC)
SADC is the Southern Africa sub-regional equivalent of ECOWAS with a current 
membership of 15 states.12 The SADC framework of co-operation is based on 
inter alia a guarantee of human rights (SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT 
COMMUNITY, 2001, art. 5 (a)(b) (c)(i)(j)(k)) which is also one of the principles of 
SADC (SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY, 2001, art. 4 (c)). 
The political institution building envisaged by SADC is said to promote economic 
development into a community based on human rights, democracy and the rule of 
law (THOKO, 2004, p. 110). However, despite the human rights centred conception of 
development within the Treaty and the centrality of human rights in its objectives, 
it is argued that human rights protection under the SADC Treaty has a secondary, 
almost cursory status (THOKO, 2004, p. 110), and that the promotion and protection 
of human rights is not the top priority of SADC (RUPPEL, 2009, p. 291). 
The SADC Tribunal was established as one of the institutions of SADC 
(SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY, 2001, art. 9 (1), (g)) with 
the duty to ensure adherence to and proper interpretation of the Treaty and its 
subsidiary instruments, and to adjudicate disputes referred to it (SOUTHERN 
AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY, 2001, art. 16 (1)). The Tribunal has 
jurisdiction over the interpretation and application of the Treaty, protocols and 
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subsidiary instruments of SADC and on all matters arising from specific agreements 
between member states, whether within the community or amongst themselves 
(SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY, 2000, art. 14). However, 
the provision establishing its jurisdiction omits an express mention of jurisdiction 
over human rights and therefore it has been argued that the tribunal lacks a 
clear human rights mandate (EBOBRAH, 2009b, p. 20). Nevertheless, despite the 
arguments regarding the nature of its jurisdiction over human rights, the SADC 
Tribunal has thus far heard and determined matters relating to human rights.13 
The tribunal has the potential to contribute significantly to a deeper 
harmonisation of law and jurisprudence and to better protection of human rights in 
SADC. This, however, depends on the commitment of member states and SADC 
institutions to the enforcement of the tribunal’s judgments (RUPPEL, 2009, p. 301) 
and clarification of the court’s jurisdiction over human rights. 
3.3 The East Africa Community, (EAC)
Economic integration in post-colonial East Africa dates back to the East African 
Co-operation Treaty of 1967 concluded between Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, 
which later collapsed (ADAR, 2008, p. 2; EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY, 2007, para. 
2 of the Preamble). The EAC was revived in 1999 through the signing of the Treaty 
Establishing the East Africa Community and its entry into force in 2000. The 
fundamental principles of the EAC include good governance which entails amongst 
others the recognition, protection and promotion of human and peoples’ rights in 
accordance with the African Charter (EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY, 2007, art. 6). 
This provision can be regarded as an entry point for human rights into the EAC. 
To the extent that the Treaty refers to respect for human rights as a component of 
good governance, makes reference to aspects of human rights, and even predicates 
the admission of new members of the community on their human rights record 
(EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY, 2007, art. 3 (3)b) then it can be argued that it has 
incorporated human rights into the treaty (RUPPEL, 2009, p. 277). 
The EAC Treaty establishes the East Africa Court of Justice (EACJ) as the 
judicial organ of the EAC (EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY, 2007, art. 9) with the 
responsibility to ensure adherence to law in the interpretation, application of, and 
compliance with the Treaty (EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY, 2007, art. 23). The EACJ 
is vested with an initial jurisdiction over the interpretation and application of the EAC 
Treaty (EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY, 2007, art. 27 (1)) and other original, appellate, 
human rights or other jurisdiction at a subsequent date upon a determination by the 
Council of Ministers (EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY, 2007, art. 27 (2)).
Article 27(2) of the EAC Treaty (EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY, 2007) deals 
with the jurisdiction of the EACJ. In doing so, reference is made to both an initial as 
well as ‘other jurisdiction as will be determined’ by the Council. This indicates that 
the member states of the EAC intended to develop its jurisdiction in phases (OJIENDA, 
2004, p. 95). As a result, the second set of areas of the EACJ’s jurisdiction which fall to 
be determined at a future date (and which includes human rights) is beyond its current 
jurisdiction. Therefore, in the absence of the relevant determination and adoption 
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of the necessary protocol, it is said that the EACJ does not yet have jurisdiction over 
human rights (PETER, 2008, p. 210; OJIENDA, 2004, p. 98; EBOBRAH, 2009b, p. 315).14 
However, the inference of lack of mandate is contested. While some 
commentators interpret it to mean that the jurisdiction is lacking (RUPPEL, 2009, 
p. 306),15 it is also argued that the provision is simply not clear (VILJOEN, 2007, p. 
504). The latter view implies the existence of an implied mandate and is backed 
by several factors including extensive references to human rights under the EAC 
Treaty and the fact that the EACJ has thus far adjudicated over cases raising 
human rights questions.16 Further, exercise of the jurisdiction articles 27(1), 31 
and 32 of the EAC Treaty is likely to touch on human rights questions. In these 
circumstances, the response of the EACJ to issues arising in such instances is of 
essence in determining whether indeed it has a human rights mandate at all.
Ultimately, the need for a clear provision on the law applicable by the EACJ 
or for a Protocol as required by article 27(2) is underscored (PETER, 2008, p. 213). 
This is in view of the fact that the EAC Treaty does not clearly outline the law 
applicable by the EACJ save for the references made to the principles of the African 
Charter in the objectives of the EAC (EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY, 2007, art. 6, 7).
4 Specific issues relating to the human rights mandate 
 of the REC Courts 
As highlighted above, the role of RECs in the protection and promotion of 
human rights in Africa is relatively new. The contribution of REC courts to the 
protection of rights in Africa notwithstanding, there are concerns in relation to 
their suitability in this regard and how this impacts on the discourse on human 
rights in the continent. These concerns are discussed below. 
4.1 Relationship of REC courts with the AHRS
A human rights system consists of a set of norms and institutions accepted by states 
as binding (FREEMAN, 2002, p. 53). Assessed against such a system, the efforts of 
RECs with respect to human rights fall short of constituting independent human 
rights systems. This is because despite making extensive references to human 
rights, they lack corresponding institutions established specifically to deal with 
human rights. This is the basis of the argument that there are no sub-regional 
human rights systems existing in Africa but that they are simply sub-regional 
intergovernmental groupings with human rights as a concern within their mandate 
(VILJOEN, 2007 p. 10). This may ultimately change if RECs commit to developing 
the existing initiatives into fully fledged systems. The African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) at a 2006 brainstorming 
meeting acknowledged that human rights do not fall under its mandate to the 
exclusion of the other organs of the AU (AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN 
AND PEOPLE’S RIGHTS, 2006, annex 2). This means that the other organs of the 
AU, including the AEC to which RECs attribute their role, are equally bound to 
integrate human rights into their mandates and function. 
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The assertions that the AHRS does not include the role of RECs must be 
understood to refer to the AHRS as established in the formal documents and 
institutions of the AU. However, it is submitted that in view of the depth of 
integration of human rights into the economic and other agenda of the AU, it is 
difficult to understand human rights in Africa without recognising the role of 
RECs. It is further arguable that despite the absence of an express linkage between 
RECs and the AHRS, it is undeniable that RECs sit in a relationship with the AU. 
Strengthening the existing RECs and establishing new ones where none exist 
are the first steps on the road towards the agenda of African economic integration 
pursued by the AEC.17 Thus it is argued that RECs as part of the AEC have a duty 
to respect and promote human rights in their jurisdictions (RUPPEL, 2009, p. 281; 
AFRICAN UNION, 2000, art. 3 (c), (l)). By analogy, REC courts, to the extent that 
they preside over matters of human rights, can be deemed to be in an informal 
relationship with the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Court) 
and the African Commission.
A human rights system comprises of a set of norms and institutions accepted 
by states as binding (FREEMAN, 2002, p. 53). In the AHRS, these are contained in the 
African Charter and its protocols and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare 
of the Child. These treaties establish the African Commission (ORGANISATION 
OF AFRICAN UNITY, 1986, art. 30), the African Court18 and the Committee of 
Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (The Committee)19 respectively. 
These bodies promote and protect the rights established under the respective 
treaties.20 There are, however, different opinions on the scope of the AHRS. Some 
scholars restrict it to the foregoing documents and institutions (BENEDEK, 2006, 
p. 46) while others extend it to include all documents adopted by the AU which 
relate to an element of human rights (HEYNS, 2004, p. 681). 
In 2008, the AU adopted a protocol21 to establish an African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR). The statute of the ACJHR is, as at the time 
of this work, not yet in force pending deposit of the 15th instrument of ratification 
(AFRICAN UNION, 2008b, art. 60). Once it is in force, the role currently vesting in 
the African Court will be overtaken by the human rights wing of the ACJHR.22 
Hence this article focuses on the African Court, as opposed to the ACJHR, as the 
only existing judicial enforcement mechanism of the AHRS. 
Entry of RECs into the protection of human rights has led to a complex 
institutional framework in the region (CHIDI, 2003, p. 3). Creation of REC courts with 
a human rights competence means that the African Court no longer has a monopoly 
in the interpretation and enforcement of the African Charter. However, the African 
Charter does not contemplate the existence of other supra-national courts in Africa 
(such as REC courts) dealing with human rights. This is explained by the fact that 
the African Charter predates the entry of RECs in the field on human rights. 
As discussed in section 2 above, RECs are the building blocks of the AEC 
that was established out of the Abuja process. As the AEC is a core project of the 
AU, a relationship can be said to exist between the AHRS and RECs as institutions 
established under the auspices of the AU. Hence it is arguably incorrect to treat the 
AEC and the RECs as distinct systems. It is therefore submitted that the literature 
THE ROLE OF SUB-REGIONAL COURTS IN THE AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM
126  ■  SUR - INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS
and documents of the AHRS have long been overtaken by practice. Nevertheless, 
this article proceeds on the basis of the formal parameters of the AHRS as described 
earlier in this section. 
4.2 Jurisdictional relationship between REC courts, 
 the African Court and the African Commission
In the absence of any jurisprudence, this relationship may be inferred from the 
weight that would be accorded to the decisions of REC courts by the African Court 
and the African Commission. The primary avenue to determine this relationship 
is to consider the criterion for admissibility of matters before the African Court 
and Commission as set out in article 56 of the African Charter (VILJOEN, 2008, p. 
78). The article raises two issues that could be relevant to the relationship between 
RECs and the AHRS. These relate to the exhaustion of local remedies and the 
principle of res judicata. 
4.2.1 Exhaustion of local remedies
In this regard it is argued that there is no obligation on victims to go to the 
REC court before submitting their matter to the African Court or the African 
Commission. The requirement of exhaustion of local remedies is relevant to the 
relationship between an international/regional court and a state. It is founded 
on the principle that the national authorities should have an opportunity to 
remedy the breach within their own jurisdiction (VILJOEN, 2007, p. 336). Local 
remedies refer to ‘the ordinary remedies of common law existing in jurisdictions 
and normally accessible to persons seeking justice’ (AFRICAN COMMISSION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS, 2004) as opposed to a supra-national court such as an REC court. 
Therefore, it is doubtful that the African Commission or African Court could 
decline to admit a matter on the basis that it has not been heard by the relevant 
REC court or even that this question might arise at all.
4.2.2 Matters settled by another court or tribunal
Article 56(7) of the African Charter (ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, 1986) 
provides that the African Commission may not admit for consideration cases 
which have been settled by the states involved in accordance with the principles 
of the United Nations, the Charter of the OAU or the African Charter. This 
provision embodies the principle of res judicata to the extent that it excludes a 
matter which has been ‘settled by the states’ involved (VILJOEN, 2007 p. 340). It 
however does not preclude the consideration of matters that are before another 
judicial or quasi-judicial forum, and hence leaves an opening for judicial forum 
shopping. In the absence of a prohibition of concurrent proceedings on the basis 
of the principle of lis pendens in the ‘other forum’, it is possible for a litigant to 
institute concurrent proceedings before a REC court and the African Commission 
or Court (VILJOEN, 2007, p. 340).
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The concern that this raises is whether one whose cause has been heard 
and determined by a REC court can approach the African Commission or Court 
for redress in the same case. This depends on both the provisions of each REC 
regarding the finality of their decisions, and the approach of the African Court or 
Commission to such matters. However, it is submitted that to allow an unsuccessful 
litigant at the sub-regional level to pursue a remedy at the regional level would 
be tantamount to establishing the African Court as an appellate body, which it is 
not. Helfer makes a similar argument in respect of the European Court of Human 
Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee (HELFER, 1999, p. 285).23 
The approaches adopted by different RECs on the relationship of their courts 
with the African Court vary.24 For instance, article 38 of the EAC Treaty provides 
that a dispute referred to the EACJ cannot be settled by any other method other 
than that established under the Treaty. This implies finality of the decisions of 
the EACJ. The Protocol of the SADC tribunal on the other hand is explicit that 
the decisions of the SADC Tribunal are final and binding (SOUTHERN AFRICAN 
DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY, 2000, art. 24 (3)). Difficulty arises where there is 
no finality clause because in that case it has to be determined whether REC courts 
are forums for dispute settlement in terms of the principles of the UN Charter, the 
OAU or the African Charter (VILJOEN, 2007, p. 339).
The Charter of the OAU encourages peaceful settlement of disputes through 
non-judicial means (ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, 1963, art. 7 (4))25 but 
this does not proscribe judicial means. The provision is not specific to human 
rights cases, but the recurrent theme is peaceful settlement. To the extent that 
international judicial settlement is considered a means for the peaceful settlement 
of disputes (ALFORD, 2000, p. 160), coupled with the presence of finality clauses 
in the REC treaties, there is potential that the decisions of the REC tribunals 
could completely oust the jurisdiction of the African Commission and the Court 
by virtue of article 56(7) of the African Charter. 
4.3 Regional and sub-regional human rights mechanisms – 
 the merits and de-merits
Whether or not the proliferation of REC courts may be deemed a blessing or a 
liability depends partly on its relative advantage or disadvantage over the existing 
regional mechanisms. There is a general underlying assumption that REC tribunals 
are favourable forums and an illustration of state commitment to the cause of 
human rights. But certain issues hold sway on the practical benefit of one relative 
to the other. These include but are not limited to accessibility, enforcement, the 
quality of jurisprudence, responsiveness to the peculiar needs of a region, potential 
for better standards of rights and the capacity to complement existing mechanisms.
First, it is argued that RECs (as opposed to regional mechanisms) are 
better suited to address sub-region specific issues. The small number of states 
constituting RECs allows them to address the issues with particular detail to 
its peculiar circumstances. Also, the notoriety of certain issues in a sub-region 
necessitates the development of jurisprudence on them in a manner that may 
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not have been considered at the regional level. In addition, the judges of a REC 
court are likely to have a better appreciation of the issues affecting a sub-region 
than those at the broader regional level. 
Second, in as far as enforcement is concerned, the African Court has the 
capacity to make binding decisions26 but it has not really presided over any matter 
yet.27 The African Commission on the other hand, despite regularly deciding on 
human rights complaints submitted to it, does not render binding decisions. In 
these circumstances, it could be argued that the binding decisions (EAST AFRICAN 
COMMUNITY, 2007, art. 35) of REC courts are the best alternative for enforcement 
of rights. However, the difficulty of enforcing the decisions of international 
courts arising from the consensual nature of international law equally affects 
REC courts. As with international courts, REC courts lack institutions with 
power to compel states to comply with its orders (EBOBRAH, 2009a, p. 96). For 
instance the government of Zimbabwe expressed its intention not to comply with 
the judgment of the SADC tribunal in the Campbell case (SOUTHERN AFRICAN 
DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY TRIBUNAL, 2007; RUPPEL, 2009, p. 300). The only 
point of recourse for the SADC Tribunal in such circumstance is to refer the finding 
of non-compliance to the Summit of Heads of States or Governments (SOUTHERN 
AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY, 2000, art. 32 (5)). Interestingly, an 
attempt has been made in recent times to enforce a decision of the SADC Tribunal 
against Zimbabwe in the South African national courts.28 This is a seemingly novel 
approach to judicial enforcement of supra-national decisions and the outcome of 
the case will be instructive regarding the prospects of success of such endeavours. 
The third issue for discussion relates to the accessibility of courts. Accessibility 
may be classified in two categories: physical accessibility and capacity to bring a 
matter before the forum. With respect to the former, the geographical proximity 
of REC courts to the victims of rights violations in some cases makes it easier for 
the victims to approach the court. In this way, the REC courts are more responsive 
to the needs of the victims. In practical terms, it means less travel cost and ease 
of litigation especially with respect to witness appearances (NWOGU, 2007, p. 
354). While it is recognised that the Interim Rules of Procedure of the African 
Commission allow it to sit in the state of origin of the claim (AFRICAN UNION, 
2008a, art. 30), in the practice of the African Commission however, matters are heard 
during its sessions which mostly take place in Banjul, the Gambia (VILJOEN, 2007, 
p. 313). Besides, hosting the sessions has financial implications for the host state 
thus it is not an attractive option. On this basis, REC courts are a more accessible 
forum for a victim of rights violations. 
Regarding the right to be heard, most REC courts allow individuals direct 
access (VILJOEN, 2007, p. 507). This contrasts access to the African Court which is 
subject to the consent of the state concerned, effected by declaration accepting the 
competence of the Court in terms of article 34(6) of the Protocol on the African 
Court (AFRICAN UNION, 2004, art. 5(3)). As of December 2010, only four states 
had tendered such a declaration29 to allow individual communications. Also, some 
of the REC treaties admit cases without the need for exhaustion of local remedies30 
thereby making it easy for individuals to access the court.
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Fourth, there is concern with respect to the capacity of the REC Courts 
to perform their protective functions regarding human rights effectively. RECs 
have demonstrated the intention to accord human rights a place in their agenda, 
but their capacity to achieve this goal is doubtful within the existing frameworks. 
Whereas there are extensive provisions on the duty of the REC member states to 
protect rights, it has been argued that there are no corresponding institutions to 
oversee the performance of these obligations or to drive the agenda of human rights 
in the REC (THOKO, 2004, p. 111).31 There is the potential for human rights to 
become secondary to the economic interests in the day to day business of the REC 
(LAMIN, 2008, p. 233). This could mean that the REC courts are more focused 
on the other functions of the REC at the expense of the development of human 
rights jurisprudence. 
Most of the REC courts have a combined jurisdiction, doubling as courts 
of justice and of human rights (RUPPEL, 2009, p. 307). This vast responsibility 
and a corresponding small number of judges appointed to the various courts raise 
questions as to whether these courts are sufficiently equipped to competently 
discharge their dual responsibilities. A further concern relates to the human rights 
competence of the judges of REC courts to determine human rights matters. 
Whereas the appointment of judges at the regional level of the AHRS emphasises 
their competence in respect of human rights (AFRICAN UNION, 2004, art. 11 (1), 
2008b, art. 4), there is no corresponding emphasis on a human rights competence 
for the appointment of judges to the REC courts (EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY, 
2007, art. 24 (1)). 
Despite the foregoing concerns, through litigation before REC courts and the 
harmonisation of legislation in the member states, there is growing jurisprudence on 
human rights in the respective sub-regions. In addition, the deliberations emanating 
from these forums are essential in enriching the human rights discourse in the sub-
regions and hence empowering the citizens. Furthermore, the judicial emphasis on 
respect for human rights emanating from REC treaty obligations serves to create 
pressure on the member states to adhere to higher standards of rights. 
Finally, most RECs in Africa recognise the African Charter as the minimum 
standard on human rights for the region, hence any attempts at the protection of 
rights within the RECs would have to build upon those contained in the African 
Charter (VILJOEN, 2007, p. 500). However, in view of the fact that there is not 
yet a human rights catalogue in any of the RECs considered in this article, this 
inference can be deemed speculative. On the other hand the evolution of rights 
into the agenda of the RECs may reveal disparate approaches to the incorporation 
of human rights into the mandate of REC courts. These differences would possibly 
translate into varying degrees of protection in each of the sub-regions. This in turn 
exposes the entire region to disparate standards and makes it difficult to reach a 
common African human rights standard. This places in question the competence 
of the RECs as building blocks to an effective regional human rights mechanism.
The foregoing factors would persist even after the establishment of the 
ACJHR (NWOGU, 2007, p. 354) and therefore, there is a strong case for the continued 
development of a human rights competence for REC courts and tribunals.
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4.4 The proliferation of supranational human rights courts in Africa
The dramatic increase in the number of international judicial bodies represents 
what is referred to as the proliferation of international courts and tribunals (SHANY, 
2003, p. 5). This phenomenon is neither unique to Africa nor specific to REC courts. 
Rather, it is global, attributable to both the nature of international law and the 
recent development in the field of international law (OELLERS-FRAHM, 2001, p. 
71).32 The ramifications of this phenomenon on the protection of human rights in 
Africa raise some issues for consideration.
Firstly, in the absence of properly coordinated judicial integration on the 
continent, it is argued that multiplicity of courts poses a threat to the unity of 
international human rights law in the region through the establishment of separate 
uncoordinated systems of international human rights standards and norms in 
different parts of Africa. This in turn creates the potential for varied interpretations 
of substantive and procedural human rights norms in the different sub-regions. 
Whereas it is highly probable that there will be disaggregated jurisprudence 
emerging from the different REC courts, it is submitted that the real problem 
is the lack of a systematically coordinated or defined relationship between the 
different REC courts rather than the issue of multiplicity of courts. Such structural 
organisation demands the existence of a normative or institutional hierarchy or 
system established under each relevant treaty.
As stipulated above, RECs do not form part of the AHRS per se, hence the 
threat of disintegration is very real. In addition, the varied approaches of REC courts 
towards the African Charter impacts on the unity of jurisprudence. For instance 
the use of the African Charter as a rights catalogue for a REC court as in the case 
of the ECOWAS Court coupled with a finality clause creates the possibility of 
variant interpretations of the same provision at regional and REC level. Currently 
only the EAC proposes a separate rights catalogue, and it may happen that the 
rights that will be contained therein may be similar in content to rights in the 
African Charter. Should this occur, there is the potential for the EACJ to decide a 
case on the same legal basis and reasoning as the African Court but derived from 
a different normative source and with no obligation to refer to either the African 
Commissiom or Court. Having said this, there is no guarantee that there would 
be a similar reasoning or outcome and likewise there is also a possibility that no 
conflict may arise. 
Nevertheless, it is noted that it is difficult to point at an instance in practice 
where an REC court or the African Commission contradicted one another. On 
the contrary, REC courts have often referred to the jurisprudence of the African 
Commission with approval to aid their decisions.33 This implies that there is an 
informal inter-fora respect and interaction. However, it would be important to have 
this relationship institutionalised to lessen the possibility of subjectivity. 
Secondly the proliferation of courts could lead to the overlap of jurisdiction 
of various courts and the possibility of conflicting decisions on the same law. 
It is argued that the availability of several judicial forums that have concurrent 
jurisdiction creates an opportunity for human rights practitioners to pursue the 
LUCYLINE NKATHA MURUNGI AND JACQUI GALLINETTI
SUR • v. 7 • n. 13 • dec. 2010 • p. 119-143  ■  131
most favourable option or to institute several proceedings in the various forums. In 
the current context, it would entail a choice between one REC court over another 
or a REC court34 and the African Court or Commission. This type of forum 
shopping is generally regarded in a negative light due to its potential to undermine 
the authority of the courts, generate conflicting decisions and create possibilities 
for endless litigation (HELFER, 1999, p. 286-287).35
The concern regarding forum shopping can, in as far as human rights are 
concerned in Africa, be regarded as perceived rather than real. Certain other factors 
mitigate the potency of this threat such as the indigence of most victims of rights 
violations (HELFER, 1999, p. 287),36 and geographical distance from the court. 
On the other hand, Helfer also argues that if well regulated, forum shopping can 
materially benefit international human rights law. For instance, forum shopping 
encourages jurists to dialogue on norms shared in the cross- cutting treaties thereby 
encouraging the development of jurisprudence. However, in view of the overlapping 
membership of African states in various RECs (RUPPEL, 2009, p. 283) and the 
possibility of conflicting decisions, it would be advisable to regulate the practice.37
5 The implications of the human rights mandate 
 of the REC courts 
This article identifies three critical issues that arise from the human rights mandate 
of the REC courts: their jurisdictional competence; the normative framework in 
which they operate, and their location within the structural framework of the 
AHRS. Each of these is discussed in more detail below.
5.1 Jurisdictional competence
Jurisdiction is a legal term referring to either a power or competence to exercise 
authority over a legally defined relationship between the subjects (EVANS; CAPPS; 
KONSTADINIDIS, 2003, p. xix). It creates a capacity to generate legal norms and to 
alter the position of those subject to such norms (ALEXY, 2002 p. 132). It also refers 
to the power of a court to determine a case before it in terms of an instrument either 
creating it or defining the jurisdiction (CHENG, 2006, p. 259). The terms competence 
and jurisdiction are so deeply intertwined that they are often used interchangeably 
(KOROMA, 2003, p. 189). But subtle distinctions can be made between the two, 
such as that while jurisdiction relates to a court’s capacity to decide a concrete case 
with final and binding force, competence regards the propriety of the exercise of 
such jurisdiction (ROSENNE, 1997, p. 536). A tribunal is generally incompetent to 
act beyond its jurisdiction (CHENG, 2006, p. 259). 
Various approaches have been adopted in defining the jurisdiction of REC 
courts with respect to human rights. Mainly, such competence is either expressly 
established by treaty or the specific intention of the state parties to the treaty is 
not clearly set out. However, despite seemingly clear distinctions between the 
approaches, the existence of jurisdiction is a matter of interpretation in each case 
especially where it is not expressly stated.
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5.1.1 Express versus implied mandates
Of the three REC courts referred to in this article, the ECOWAS Court is said 
to have an express human rights mandate (EBOBRAH, 2009a, p. 80). With respect 
to the EACJ and the SADC Tribunal, the answer is not so obvious though the 
general inclination is that they have an implied mandate (RUPPEL, 2009, p. 307). 
It is reported that inclusion of a specific human rights mandate for the SADC 
Tribunalwas discussed and rejected, with a panel of experts mandated to draft a 
proposal for the tribunal preferring a general jurisdiction with respect to human 
rights (VILJOEN, 2007, p. 505). The absence of express provisions notwithstanding, 
both the EACJ and the SADC tribunal have decided cases that impact on human 
rights issues.38 
While the two tribunals are often collectively said to lack express jurisdiction 
over human rights (EBOBRAH, 2009a, p. 80), a subtle but critical distinction must 
be made between their provisions regarding human rights. The Protocol on SADC 
Tribunal is silent on the human rights mandate of the tribunal.39 The EAC Treaty 
on the other hand expressly excludes such jurisdiction until the adoption of a 
Protocol to expand the jurisdiction of the EACJ to human rights (EAST AFRICAN 
COMMUNITY, 2007, art. 27 (2)). In effect, while the silence of the SADC Protocol 
can be interpreted as indifference on the subject, legitimacy of the exercise of a 
human rights jurisdiction by the EACJ is even more precarious.
The exercise or assertion of jurisdiction rests on a quest for legitimacy to be 
found in the expression of state consent (KOROMA, 2003, p. 198). Legitimacy of the 
court’s actions is circumscribed by the bounds of its authority. It affects the response 
of the parties to the decision rendered; if such decision is deemed to exceed the power 
of the court, it is unlikely to be enforced effectively. Absence of an express jurisdiction 
leaves it upon the court and the parties to delimit the scope of the courts authority. 
This opens an opportunity for subjectivity and conservativism that could injure 
genuine pursuit of redress. 
In Katabazi and 21 others v Secretary General of the East African Community 
and another (EAST AFRICAN COURT OF JUSTICE, 2007), the applicants were part 
of a group of 21 charged with treason and misprision of treason. The application 
claimed inter alia a breach of articles 6, 7(2) and 8 (1) (c) of the EAC treaty relative 
to the fundamental principles of the EAC, the operational principles thereof and 
the general undertaking of the states to implement the EAC Treaty. Counsel for the 
applicants requested the EACJ to regard the matter as an application for determination 
of whether the conduct of the state of Uganda was in breach of a fundamental principle 
of the EAC. Counsel for the respondent on the other hand argued that the claims 
of the applicants related to a question of human rights over which the EACJ did not 
have jurisdiction by virtue of article 27(2) of the EAC Treaty.
In response to the question of its jurisdiction, the EACJ stated as follows
Does this Court have jurisdiction to deal with human rights issues? The quick answer 
is: No it does not have.....It is very clear that jurisdiction with respect to human rights 
requires a determination of the Council and a conclusion of a Protocol to that effect. 
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Both of those steps have not been taken. It follows, therefore, that this Court may not 
adjudicate on disputes concerning violation of human rights per se.
Yet it continued, 
While the Court will not assume jurisdiction to adjudicate on human rights disputes, 
it will not abdicate from exercising its jurisdiction of interpretation under Article 27 
(1) merely because the reference includes allegation of human rights violation. 
(EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY, 2007, art. 27 (1)). 40
On this basis, the EACJ found that the principle of the rule of law, a fundamental 
principle of the community, had been breached. 
The decision of the court to deal with the matter in the face of an express 
exclusion of its jurisdiction over human rights is nothing short of extreme judicial 
activism, skewed towards a usurpation of legislative functions (EBOBRAH, 2009a, 
p. 82). Yet, if the court had determined otherwise, it would indeed have ‘abdicated 
itself ’ from performing a duty with which it is vested in terms of the treaty; that 
to interpret a provision of the Treaty. Therein lies the dilemma of courts whose 
express mandate does not sufficiently cover the scope of its functions. The capacity 
of a court to address an issue is circumscribed by the scope of its mandate. Hence 
a clear articulation of the mandate of the EACJ is necessary to avoid this impasse. 
During the hearing of the main application in the Campbell case41 the 
respondent contested the jurisdiction of the SADC Tribunal arguing that in the 
absence of a rights protocol, the tribunal had no jurisdiction over human rights. In 
response, the SADC Tribunal stated that stipulation of human rights, democracy 
and the rule of law as a principle of SADC sufficed to grant it jurisdiction over 
matters of human rights, democracy and rule of law. Though the mandate of SADC 
Tribunal is not expressly excluded as in the case of the EAC, it is clear that this 
omission gave an opportunity for contestation and is hence undesirable. 
In Olajide v Nigeria (ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES, 
2004) the ECOWAS Court declined to adjudicate over questions of human rights 
arguing that its protocol did not confer such jurisdiction. The matter arose prior to 
the 2005 amendment of the Protocol relating to the ECOWAS Court which vested 
the court with jurisdiction over human rights and allowed individual access to the 
court. The decision was taken despite the existence of ‘sufficient human rights content 
in the constitutional and other legislative instruments of ECOWAS’ (EBOBRAH, 
2008, p. 17). It was argued that where the meaning of the treaty was clear, the court 
would apply it as such (ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES, 
2004, para. 53-54). The decision has been criticised as shying away from activism in that 
case since nothing in the Protocol prevented the admission of the matter (VILJOEN, 
2007, p. 507). Thus, in light of this case, the benefit of an express mandate is clear. 
The foregoing cases illustrate three main issues underlying the exercise of 
an implied jurisdiction. First, the exercise of such jurisdiction can be interpreted as 
exceeding the authority of the court and therefore compromise the legitimacy of the 
decision. It also makes the scope of the power of the court elusive. Secondly, it creates 
an opening for litigious contestation of the courts authority thereby lengthening the 
THE ROLE OF SUB-REGIONAL COURTS IN THE AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM
134  ■  SUR - INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS
process unnecessarily which is undesirable for human rights litigation. Lastly, it accords 
discretion to the judicial officers to determine the court’s competence. This introduces 
subjectivity and in the face of a conservative bench, the likelihood that such matters 
may not be admitted. This is for instance clear when the decisions of the EAC and 
the ECOWAS Court in Katabazi (EAST AFRICAN COURT OF JUSTICE, 2007) and 
Olajide (ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES, 2004) are contrasted.
In light of the foregoing factors, it can be concluded that an implied mandate 
for human rights, whilst not absolutely barring exercise of jurisdiction, does not 
achieve optimum protection for rights and is inconsistent with the commitment 
of RECs to protection of human rights evident in their founding documents.
5.2 Normative framework
This refers to the body of law applied by REC courts in dispensing their obligations 
under their respective treaties and which defines the values and goals pursued by the 
REC and the primary rules that impose duties on actors to perform or abstain from 
actions (DIEHL; KU; ZAMORA, 2003, p. 51). The normative sources applied by REC 
courts in exercise of the human rights mandate vary from one REC to the next. For 
instance, the literal reading of article 21 of the SADC Protocol on the Tribunal implies 
sufficiency to direct the tribunal on what law to apply. With respect to human rights, 
however, the answer is not as obvious. The SADC treaty establishes an obligation 
for states to abide by the principle of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. 
But the normative source of such standards is not specified. 
Similarly, article 27(2) of the EAC Treaty can be interpreted to mean that 
the law to be applied by the EACJ with respect to human rights will be defined in 
the Protocol that will expand the court’s jurisdiction. However, the EAC Treaty 
establishes ‘recognition, promotion and protection of human rights in accordance with 
the provisions of the African Charter as a fundamental principle of the EAC (EAST 
AFRICAN COMMUNITY, 2007, art. 6 (d)). Hence, a determination of whether a state 
party is in breach of the treaty would inevitably entail a determination of whether or 
not the conduct is a breach of the African Charter. That demands an enquiry into the 
substantive content of the rights. Nevertheless, it is submitted that this does not suffice 
to establish the African Charter as a normative source or standard of rights in the EAC. 
5.2.1 The African Charter as a rights catalogue for REC courts
It has been suggested that in view of the wide recognition of the African Charter as a 
standard for rights in the RECs, it can be employed as the normative source of rights 
for REC courts as all the AU members are party to the African Charter (VILJOEN, 
2007, p. 500). It is further argued that the development of ‘distinct sub-regional human 
rights standards, such as the SADC Charter of Fundamental Social Rights, is likely to 
accentuate differences, [thereby] undermining the movement towards African unity 
and legal integration’ (VILJOEN, 2007, p. 501). These arguments are founded on an 
assumption that the RECs recognize the African Charter as a standard for rights. 
Notably however, the SADC Treaty does not make any reference to the African 
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Charter. But this does not mean that failure to refer to it implies disaccord with its 
provisions. Indeed, in the Campbell case, the SADC Tribunal referred to the African 
Charter extensively and even relied on the jurisprudence of the African Commission. 
The interpretation and enforcement of the African Charter is a function of the 
African Commission and the African Court. The suggestion of its application by REC 
courts would create another forum for interpretation and enforcement. Recalling the 
absence of judicial hierarchy, the use of finality clauses with respect to the decisions of REC 
courts, the exclusion of REC courts from the formal structure of the AHRS and lack of 
judicial coordination in the region, the inevitable result of this suggestion is a replication 
of forums with a similar mandate and a real chance of conflicting decisions. It does not 
hold promise for addressing the threats to the unity of human rights law in the region.
The use of the African Charter as a rights catalogue blurs the normative 
hierarchy between the regional and sub-regional human rights instruments that 
underlies the intention of the eventual unification at the regional level. Such 
hierarchy is implicit in judicial order and is an invaluable asset for the AHRS. 
Thus the argument for the African Charter as a rights catalogue for the RECs is 
not as obviously advantageous as some authors contend. 
In supporting his argument for the African Charter as a rights catalogue 
for RECs, Viljoen observes that separate cataloguing of human rights is likely to 
accentuate differences and undermine integration (VILJOEN, 2007, p. 500). However, 
it is submitted that the possibility of accentuating differences is adequately mitigated 
by the recognition of the African Charter and other international standards of human 
rights as a normative minimum. For instance the draft East African Bill of Rights 
(PETER, 2008, p. 336)42 has extensive provisions covering both the rights established 
under the African Charter and beyond. If adopted, it would present better protection 
than the African Charter. In the case of SADC, there are differences of opinion on 
whether the SADC Charter of Fundamental Social Rights can be deemed as a rights 
catalogue for the SADC Tribunal (VILJOEN, 2007, p. 500; RUPPEL, 2009, p. 295-296).
5.3 Structural framework
The structural framework refers to the institutional organisation of the AHRS. A 
system is a purposeful arrangement of interrelated elements or components which 
cannot be adequately described and understood in isolation from one another 
(SHANY, 2003, p. 78). It has been established in the preceding sections that REC 
courts are not formally recognised as part of the AHRS. A concern arises regarding 
the relationship between the REC courts and the institutions established at the 
regional level, and how the AHRS institutional framework can be modified (if at 
all) to accommodate the role of REC courts. 
Generally RECs do not constitute independent human rights systems 
(VILJOEN, 2007, p. 10). They are created for the pursuit of economic integration 
and the promotion and protection of human rights is barely incidental to that main 
purpose. Furthermore, they do not have institutions specifically tailored towards the 
performance of human rights functions. If RECs indeed fall short of independent 
human rights systems in Africa, then, in order for them to achieve the optimum 
THE ROLE OF SUB-REGIONAL COURTS IN THE AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM
136  ■  SUR - INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS
protection of rights as envisaged in their respective documents they need either to 
fully develop their institutions to a fully fledged system or to align with a better 
co-ordinated and institutionally established system, namely the AHRS.
6 Conclusion
The significance of the role played by REC courts in the protection of human rights 
in the Africa today cannot be denied. It is a reflection of a renewed commitment 
by African states to the realisation of human rights in the region. It also points to 
the fact that the traditional human rights institutional framework in the region 
has long been overtaken by practice. The formal parameters of the AHRS do not 
adequately cater for the role of RECs in the field of human rights. This deprives 
the region of the benefits of the coordinated development of protective mechanisms 
that would create an optimum environment for the protection of rights. Though 
there are numerous problems associated with the emerging role of RECs in the 
protection of human rights, there is an equal wealth of benefits to be reaped from 
their work. The problems highlighted in this article render themselves to a solution 
through proper delimitation of the role of REC courts and restructuring of the 
system to take cognisance of the recent developments. 
Whether or not the region stands to benefit from the role of these new players 
is almost entirely dependent on the willingness of states to revisit the AHRS and 
to align the operations of the RECs with the regional framework.
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RESUMO
O desenvolvimento de comunidades sub-regionais na África não é um fenômeno novo, 
mas a incorporação de direitos humanos em suas agendas é relativamente recente. Com 
efeito, as cortes das comunidades econômicas regionais introduziram uma nova dimensão 
de proteção supranacional dos direitos humanos na África. Esse desenvolvimento é 
bem-vindo, porque provavelmente fará progredir a promoção e a proteção dos direitos 
humanos. Entretanto, considerando que o foco principal dessas comunidades é o 
desenvolvimento econômico, sua capacidade de efetivamente compreender o papel da 
proteção dos direitos humanos é questionável. O desenvolvimento desse mandato para 
as cortes sub-regionais é necessário pela proeminência emergente dos direitos humanos 
nos negócios das comunidades econômicas regionais. Sua interpretação e implementação, 
contudo, tem amplas ramifi cações para a promoção dos direitos humanos na África, a 
harmonização dos padrões de direitos humanos na região e para a unidade e a efetividade 
do Sistema Africano de Direitos Humanos.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE
Integração regional – Comunidades econômicas regionais – Mandato para direitos humanos 
– Cortes sub-regionais – Sistema Africano de Direitos Humanos – Jurisdição relativa a 
direitos humanos
RESUMEN
El desarrollo de las comunidades subregionales en África no es un fenómeno nuevo, pero 
la incorporación de los derechos humanos a su agenda es relativamente reciente. En efecto, 
los tribunales REC han introducido un nuevo manto de protección supra-nacional a los 
derechos humanos en África. Este hecho es bienvenido porque puede producir un paso 
adelante en la promoción y protección de los derechos humanos. Sin embargo, considerando 
que el objetivo principal de las REC es el desarrollo económico, su capacidad para asumir 
efi cazmente la función de protección de los derechos humanos es discutible. La creciente 
importancia de los derechos humanos en los asuntos de las REC necesita del desarrollo de 
este mandato para los tribunales subregionales. Pero la interpretación e implementación que 
ellos hagan tendrá amplias ramifi caciones para el avance de los derechos humanos en África, 
para la armonización de los estándares de derechos humanos en la región y para la unidad y 
efi cacia del sistema africano de derechos humanos. 
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